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Preface
There is currently much interest and debate in the UK about the 
structure and scope of corporation tax. The debate has included a wide 
set of issues, ranging from the level of the headline rate, and the impact 
of various European Court of Justice decisions on a variety of issues, 
to the extent to which the administration of tax creates uncertainty and 
additional costs for business. 
The role of the deductibility of interest costs against corporation tax 
has also played a prominent role in this debate, and this is why this 
topic was chosen as the subject of this first report from the Centre. 
Given the technical nature of some of the issues involved, the Centre 
was fortunate to be able to use the services of two tax professionals 
from business. Peter Wharrad has worked extensively in business, most 
recently for Vodafone. James Pennock joined the Centre for a period 
on secondment from PricewaterhouseCoopers; the Centre is very 
grateful to PwC for its support. The other two authors are members of 
the Centre: Michael Devereux is the Director, and Socrates Mokkas is 
a Research Fellow. 
Thanks are due to a number of people and organisations: first, to the 
Hundred Group of Finance Directors, whose donation enabled the 
Centre to be established and which has effectively funded the research 
described in this report; second, to the individuals and companies who 
took part in the interviews described in Section 5; and third, to Stephen 
Bond, Giorgia Maffini and Simon Loretz for helpful comments on the 
research reported here. However, responsibility for the report remains 
solely with the authors.
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Executive Summary
This report discusses the treatment of the relief for interest payments 
against UK corporation tax. In particular, it addresses whether the 
existing treatment is in need of reform, and also considers whether 
some specific reforms would be beneficial. 
Relief for interest payments is a significant part of virtually all 
corporation taxes around the world. This stands in stark contrast to 
economics literature, which argues that there is no good economic 
rationale for treating debt differently from equity. But the impetus for 
reform in the UK comes instead from more pressing developments. In 
particular, a recent decision of the European Court of Justice has cast 
doubt on the existing UK treatment of controlled foreign companies, 
and an opinion of the Advocate General has similarly cast doubt on the 
continuation of taxing receipts of dividends from foreign subsidiaries.
The treatment of interest is not directly linked to these issues. But if 
foreign source dividends became exempt from UK tax, the question 
would arise as to whether it would continue to be appropriate to 
give relief for interest on borrowing to finance overseas activity, 
which would never be taxed in the UK. One response to a possible 
restriction on interest relief is that, to a large extent, the UK does not 
tax foreign source dividends under the existing system; so changing to 
an exemption system would make little difference. But this response 
cuts both ways: in that case, there is already a case for restricting relief 
for interest.
This report considers two complementary sources of evidence on the 
impact of existing tax systems on the use of debt. First, using aggregate 
data and unconsolidated accounting data, it compares the use of debt 
across countries to that country’s tax rate. As might be expected, a 
higher tax rate is associated with a greater use of debt. The obvious 
explanation is that the relative benefit of debt over equity increases 
with the tax rate, and hence so does the use of debt.
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It also seems likely that companies that are part of multinational groups 
are more sensitive to the host country tax rate than purely domestic 
companies. However, although there is some evidence of this in the 
academic literature, the simple evidence presented here is not consistent 
with this hypothesis. 
The second source of evidence presented in the report is a set of 
structured interviews held with the tax directors of 14 large multinational 
groups in the UK. These groups include both UK and US parented 
multinationals, and cover a broad range of sectors. The interviews 
covered two issues: how tax affects the existing financial structure of 
the groups, and how potential reforms to the UK corporation tax might 
affect decisions regarding financial structure. 
Broadly, the results of the interviews indicate that UK multinationals 
typically hold all third party debt in the UK. Having raised debt in the 
UK, it is then disseminated around the group as needed, using both 
equity and debt, and taking into account the tax profile of both the 
funding and receiving countries. Few UK multinational companies 
now make use of hybrid entities or hybrid-based financial products. 
Legislation in 2005 significantly limited the scope for such activity, 
and most respondents considered that highly structured tax-driven 
products had only a short shelf life.
Respondents were asked to comment on a number of hypothetical 
reforms to the UK tax regime. 
There was some agreement about the logic of introducing some form 
of interest apportionment to restrict relief to interest on borrowing 
to finance activity in the UK. However, a consensus view was that 
it would be impossible to introduce any form of apportionment in 
practice without creating considerable administrative and compliance 
cost, and uncertainty.
As might be expected, the option of simply reducing the rate of tax at 
which interest could be relieved – say, to 15% - met with little support. 
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The consensus view expressed was that such a reform would impose 
considerable costs, and reduce the attractiveness of the UK as a location 
for economic activity. 
However, a rather more favourable response met the hypothesis that 
the tax rate on interest received would also be cut. Most respondents 
considered that a 15% rate on interest received and paid would be 
sufficiently competitive such that the incentive for offshore financial 
planning would be removed. Debt would be pushed down to 
subsidiaries, reducing the overall UK expense, while there would also 
be an incentive to remit interest to the UK. Perhaps not surprisingly 
again, reducing the corporation tax rate on all activity also met with a 
positive response. Profit repatriation generally would be encouraged 
should this change be coupled with an exemption from tax for overseas 
dividends.
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1 Introduction
Virtually all the world’s corporation taxes are based on the return to 
equity finance. The tax base is the return from investment, net of the 
cost of debt finance. By contrast, virtually all the economics literature 
on this issue has argued that taxes on profit should treat equity and debt 
finance in the same way. One interesting issue is how this divergence 
came about1. A more pressing issue though, and one considered here 
in the context of the UK, is whether a government should consider 
reforms which remove, or reduce, the advantage to debt finance.
The fact that almost all corporation taxes do permit interest payments 
to be deducted from taxable profit raises an important question as to the 
social costs of having this potential distortion to economic behaviour. 
This is a difficult question, and one which this report does not attempt 
to answer directly. However, the report does offer some indirect 
evidence, by presenting information on the extent to which existing 
taxes induce greater use of debt finance. 
Distinguishing between debt and equity raises practical as well as 
broader conceptual issues. The most obvious question is what are the 
distinguishing characteristics of a financial contract which indicate that, 
for tax purposes, it is debt rather than equity? Beyond that, differences 
in tax rates across countries create tax planning opportunities. Suppose 
a multinational company operates in country A and country B, and 
country A has the higher tax rate. Then (other things being equal) 
the company has an incentive to borrow in A rather than B, since the 
value of the interest deduction is greater. Unsurprisingly, governments 
typically seek to limit these planning opportunities. They do so in a 
number of ways – such as limiting interest relief with reference to the 
size of the interest payment relative to income, or, by introducing rules 
which are intended to allocate debt between that used at home and that 
used abroad. 
1   In the context of the USA, this is the subject of a paper by Robert Walsh (2001).
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This report addresses the role of interest deductibility for the UK 
corporation tax. In Section 2 some of the conceptual issues which arise 
in an economic analysis of the design of a tax on company profit are 
addressed. It also sets out a broad outline of alternative approaches for 
reform. Section 3 describes the UK treatment of interest deductibility 
in more detail, and compares the UK to other major tax regimes 
worldwide. 
Sections 4 and 5 present new evidence on the impact of interest 
deductibility on business behaviour in the UK and elsewhere. Section 
4 uses both aggregate data on foreign direct investment and accounting 
data from unconsolidated companies across Europe to analyse 
the relationship between the use of debt finance and tax rates.  For 
example, it describes the average leverage in a number of European 
countries, and also compares the position for companies which are part 
of a multinational group and those which are independent companies. 
Section 5 reports the results of a survey of large UK businesses. 
Businesses were asked about their current financial policies and the 
influence of taxes in determining those policies. They were also asked 
how those policies would be likely to change in the event of various 
hypothetical tax reforms. Section 6 briefly concludes the report.
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2  Conceptual issues
The UK corporation tax, along with virtually all others, is based on the 
gross return to an investment in the case of equity finance and the net 
return, after interest is paid, in the case of debt finance. 
The starting point for an analysis of this differential tax treatment 
must be a definition of these two forms of finance. In principle, both 
represent a financial contract between a supplier and user of finance; 
for the purposes of this report, the latter is a limited liability company. 
It is the conditions included in the contract which differentiate debt 
and equity. 
Typically, there are three key differences:  
• Debt has a prior claim to income generated; equity receives the  
 residual after debt has been paid.
• Debt receives a return which is determined in advance (in the   
 absence of bankruptcy); equity receives a variable return   
 depending  on the income generated. 
• The suppliers of equity typically have voting rights; suppliers of  
 debt typically do not. 
2.1   Should debt be treated more favourably in 
  corporation tax?
Starting from a clean sheet, would any of these conditions lead us to 
consider that debt and equity income should be treated differently by 
the tax system? 
One possible answer might be that all three of these conditions imply 
that interest paid is an expense of doing business. The supplier of equity 
finance – the shareholder - is the owner of the company, who receives 
profit after paying interest. Corporation tax should be thought of as 
simply an attempt to tax the income accruing to the shareholder. 
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In fact, this is often how corporation tax is justified. The argument is 
that the tax system ought to attempt to tax all sources of income to, and 
increases in wealth of, an individual (ideally at the same rate). This is 
clearly very difficult in the case of that part of an individual’s increase in 
wealth which takes the form of retained corporate profit. A corporation 
tax, while not perfect in this respect, nevertheless compensates to some 
extent for not taxing the individual shareholder directly. This view of 
corporation tax also justifies relatively light personal tax treatment 
of dividends and capital gains on shares; any personal tax represents 
“double taxation” of this income. 
But this argument does not justify the absence of any tax on the return to 
debt. Instead, it would imply that since the lender has also received an 
income, he should also be taxed accordingly. This raises the question of 
how interest income is taxed at the personal level: if corporation tax is 
intended to be a tax only on equity income, then we might expect there 
to be an equivalent personal tax which is levied on interest income. Of 
course there is, at least for some shareholders. 
In the clearest example, consider the case in which there is a corporation 
tax at 25%, but that dividends and capital gains on shares are not taxed 
at the personal level. Suppose also that there is a personal income tax 
on interest received, also at 25%. Finally, suppose that the corporation 
makes a profit before interest of £100. If it is financed by equity, there 
would be a corporation tax charge of £25, and dividends could be paid 
which would be worth a net £75 to the shareholder. If it is financed 
by debt, then the company can pay interest of £100 to the lender, who 
must pay income tax of £25, earning again a net £75. Hence the tax 
treatment would be equivalent. This is essentially the basis of the dual 
income taxes seen in Scandinavian countries, where it is aimed to tax 
all capital income at the same rate. 
However, there are two broad problems with the argument that equity 
and debt might be similarly treated taking into account personal as well 
as corporate taxes. First, in general, and specifically in the UK, these 
tax rates are not the same. For example, higher rate taxpayers may pay 
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additional taxes on dividend income or on capital gains on shares. Or 
tax-exempt lenders may pay no tax on interest income. Either of these 
circumstances (or many others) would rule out the equivalence of the 
simple example. In most cases, the overall effect is still to benefit debt 
relative to equity. 
Of course, the provider of finance may also be non-resident, and not 
subject to personal taxes, at least in the country of residence of the 
company. In this case, incentives depend on the personal taxes which 
the provider of finance eventually faces in his own country. But 
the revenue effects are different, since this personal tax is collected 
elsewhere. 
These differences may clearly affect the incentives of both the company 
and the supplier of finance. It may be, for example, that the two 
participants would prefer an equity contract, but that the tax system 
induces them to choose a debt contract. When the tax system induces 
changes of behaviour of this sort, there is generally some welfare cost. 
In this case, for example, higher debt is likely ultimately to lead to 
higher bankruptcy.
The second problem is that a system in which equity income is taxed 
at the level of the company and income from debt taxed at the personal 
level requires both tax systems to be able to draw a clear distinction 
between the two forms of finance. At the corporate level, there is an 
incentive to create a financial instrument which resembles debt and 
which therefore benefits from interest deductibility. At the personal 
level, the reverse is true. By contrast, if the income from debt and 
equity was treated the same at both levels, then no important distinction 
would need to be drawn. This is part of a more general issue to which 
we now turn.
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2.2  What are the important conceptual differences between  
  equity  and debt?
The distinction between debt and equity drawn above rested on three 
broad factors. But financial contracts can be very flexible. It is clearly 
possible to construct contracts that have some, but not all, of the 
characteristics of debt set out above. For example, a financial contract 
may give voting rights, but a fixed rate of return; or it may give a fixed 
rate of return plus some proportion of residual income; or it may pay a 
fixed return but not have the prior claim to income. Any combination of 
these, and more detailed aspects of financial contracts, could be drawn 
up between two contracting parties. This raises two questions.
First, if there were an argument for differential treatment of debt and 
equity, then on what characteristic of the financial contract should 
it depend? On the priority of the claim? Or on the rights to residual 
income? Or on voting rights? Taking the argument this extra step seems 
to further undermine any possible rationale for differential treatment. 
It is hard to see precisely what aspects of debt are vital for justifying 
its favourable tax treatment.
Second, if governments aim to maintain such tax regimes (as they 
clearly do), they need to be able to distinguish the return to equity and 
the return to debt. But hybrid financial products, almost by definition, 
combine elements of debt and equity. To maintain this distinction 
therefore requires complex rules which are costly to enforce and 
comply with. It may also introduce uncertainty into the tax system, 
since taxpayers may not know whether a new financial instrument will 
be treated as debt or equity if the tax administration is not be able or 
willing to give binding guidance. This is particularly important in an 
international context.
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2.3  The welfare costs of maintaining differential treatment,   
  and of reform
As a general principle, an efficient tax system would require that the 
tax system has no effect on the choice of in what form to save. The tax 
distinction between equity and debt is not generally consistent with 
this principle. But how much does that matter? What are the welfare 
costs associated with this distortion?
The most obvious behavioural effect of favourable treatment for debt 
is that financial contracts will be more likely to take the form of debt. 
The welfare costs of such a distortion are hard to measure, and we 
have been unable to find such measures in the academic literature. A 
greater use of debt is clearly associated with a greater propensity for 
bankruptcy. There may also be more subtle effects, given that lenders 
typically do not receive voting power in the company. 
A rather different potential cost is the creation of tax planning 
opportunities. Any difference in overall tax rates between debt and 
equity may give rise to such opportunities. As noted above, these are 
particularly important in an international context. Interest payments 
are generally deductible, and interest received is taxable. This gives 
rise to the incentives described above: there is a clearly an incentive 
to borrow in high tax countries, and to use equity in low tax countries. 
Governments have introduced complex rules to try to prevent what 
they consider to be tax avoidance which makes use of these differences. 
There are two separate welfare costs here: the fact that the financial 
structure of corporations is affected by this tax treatment, and the 
costs associated with tax planning, compliance and administration of 
complex anti-avoidance rules. 
Of course, there may also be welfare cost if there is a reform of 
interest deductibility. Companies have structured their activities in 
the expectation that interest will continue to be deductible. Clearly 
any revenue-neutral reform will generate gainers and losers. The 
extent to which companies may lose depends partly on whether they 
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(and investors) can change their financing patterns, and the costs of 
implementing such changes. Probably large business can, although 
it will take time, and there will be costs which are greater the more 
complex the financial operations of the business. Further, it may be 
the case that some smaller businesses cannot change their financing 
patterns, though in turn that may depend on the willingness of banks 
and venture capital firms to change their mode of financing.
2.4  Proposals for fundamental reform
The economics literature has considered two broad ways in which debt 
and equity could be given equal treatment. The most straightforward 
is to disallow interest payments as an expense. This is essentially the 
“Comprehensive Business Income Tax”, or CBIT, proposal made by 
the US Treasury Department in a 1992 report.2
The opposite approach is to attempt to give equity the same tax 
treatment as debt. This is more difficult to achieve, but one method was 
proposed by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in 1991.3 They proposed 
that the amount of relief given was based on accumulated new equity 
plus retained taxable income.4 The net effect of this proposal is to shift 
the corporation tax into a tax on economic rent:  that is, it applies only 
to profit over and above the minimum required rate of return (which is 
not taxed, whether it is financed by debt or equity). 
Taxing only economic rent has long been advocated by economists (see, 
for example, the report of the Meade Committee (1978)). The reason 
is that decisions at the margin are, in principle at least, not affected 
by tax, since the marginal investment is not taxed. However, a tax on 
economic rent does have disadvantages. One important factor is that, 
to raise the same amount of tax revenue, it would need to have a higher 
headline tax rate. This would increase the incentive for companies to 
2   US Treasury Department (1992).
3   Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991).
4   Belgium has recently introduced a notional interest deduction along these lines.
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shift profit out of the UK. By contrast, moving in the direction of the 
CBIT would permit a reduction in the tax rate, which would lessen the 
incentive to shift profits abroad, and may even reverse the incentives. 
2.5 Proposals for less fundamental reform
Broad economic principles undoubtedly make a case to be made for a 
reform of the corporation tax treatment of the return to debt and equity 
finance. However, there are other considerations apart from these broad 
principles.
Recent decisions of the European Court of Justice, and opinions 
expressed by the Advocate General, have raised several questions in 
the design in corporation taxes in the EU, some of which are outlined 
in more detail in Section 3. In the UK, these cases have raised questions 
over two of the building blocks of corporation tax. One question is 
whether it is any longer wise to attempt to tax foreign source dividends 
flowing into the UK from foreign subsidiaries of UK-resident 
companies. Of course, there are also broader economic arguments for 
and against such taxation, but we will not address those here. A second 
question is whether existing CFC rules can be used and relied upon in 
preventing avoidance by shifting profit abroad.
Neither of these questions is directly related to the deducibility of 
interest in the UK. It is true that exempting foreign source dividends 
from UK tax throws into sharper relief the fact that the UK generally 
permits interest paid to be deducted, even when the activity funded 
by the borrowing may take place elsewhere (although there is some 
indication that HMRC are increasingly challenging this, especially for 
companies whose parent is not in the UK). But even under the existing 
system, in which the UK taxes dividend income, but with a credit for 
underlying taxes paid abroad, the UK in effect barely taxes foreign 
source income. Thus, if there is an argument that there should be a 
restriction on interest paid on debt that is used outside the UK, then this 
argument almost certainly already applies under the existing system.
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A related case for apportionment seems less strong. One argument is 
that, given current uncertainty about CFC regimes, if the UK moved 
to a dividend exemption system it might open the floodgates to a 
significant part of UK taxable income moving abroad, where it could 
be more lightly taxed and then returned to the UK. Given this, anything 
which strengthened the tax base, such as restricting interest relief, may 
help to maintain tax revenue. But if this were a potential problem, it 
would be due to failings of the CFC regime, rather than a movement 
to dividend exemption. As such, a prior attempt at a solution should lie 
with the CFC regime, rather than an attempt to restrict the deductibility 
of interest. 
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the government will feel 
constrained to introduce some modification of the deductibility of 
interest. In this report we therefore consider alternative approaches, 
paying some attention to practical considerations as to whether such an 
apportionment can be carried out at reasonable cost. More specifically, 
in Section 5, we put various options for reform to leading tax directors 
of large multinational companies, to find their reactions and how they 
thought their company might respond. These options included reducing 
the tax rate generally; reducing the rate as applied to relief for interest 
paid; and also lowering the tax rate as applied to interest received. We 
also considered various forms of apportionment of interest. 
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3 A brief guide to the UK treatment of interest for   
 corporation tax
Although the previous section of this report was based on the notion 
that interest expense was deductible for UK corporation tax, the details 
are far from straightforward. This section outlines in a little more detail 
the relevant aspects of the structure of the UK corporation tax regime, 
and compares it to that in other countries.
 
Relief for expenses relating to debt financing, in particular interest 
expense, is generally given for UK corporation tax purposes under 
Schedule D Case III. Interest expense can first be offset against any 
current year Schedule D Case III income (e.g. interest income). 
After this, it can be offset against three other forms of income: (a) 
other current year income of the UK company, (e.g. trading income, 
chargeable gains or dividend income); (b) Schedule D Case III income 
of the UK company in the previous 12 months; or (c) current year 
profits chargeable to UK corporation tax of another UK resident 
company5 within the same group as the first UK company. Any surplus 
after these options have been exhausted must be carried forward to set 
against future non-trading profits of the UK company that incurred the 
deficit. In practice, this will clearly only be possible if the company has 
non-trading income. 
For UK tax purposes, interest expense is generally available as shown 
in the company’s statutory accounts, provided these conform to 
generally accepted accounting practice.6 However, that leaves open 
the issue of differentiating interest from a dividend. The UK tax code 
defines a variety of circumstances where a payment to a provider of 
5   Or a UK permanent establishment (“PE”) of a foreign company.
6   Where a loan exists between two connected parties, relief is available on an accruals basis only,   
 and where the lender is a connected foreign tax resident, relief is only available on an accruals   
 basis where the interest is paid by the UK tax resident company within 12 months of the   
 accounting period in which it accrues. The timing of payment of the interest in these circumstances  
 can be delayed where clearance has to be sought in advance from Centre for Non Residents to settle  
 the interest at a reduced rate of UK income tax under the terms of the relevant double taxation   
 agreement, or under the terms of the EU Interest and Royalties Directive.
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finance should be characterised as a dividend, rather than as interest 
(and hence not deductible from tax). These characteristics broadly 
relate to the distinctions between debt and equity set out above. 
For example, the following would be treated as a dividend, rather 
than interest: interest paid in excess of a commercial return on the 
loan principal or where the payment is dependent on the results of the 
company’s business, and interest paid on debt which is convertible 
into equity on terms not reasonably comparable with those of quoted 
securities. There are also rules which distinguish between debt and 
equity in order to determine ownership for tax grouping purposes. And 
there are also provisions which classify a transaction as either debt or 
equity where this might be unclear. For example, "repo transactions" 
involve the sale and repurchase of shares by a UK company where the 
difference between the sale and repurchase price constitutes a finance 
charge; in prescribed circumstances these are treated as debt. 
3.1  Anti-avoidance
UK tax relief for interest expense is subject to a number of anti-
avoidance provisions that restrict relief where certain criteria are 
met. We summarise these under two headings. “Thin capitalisation 
provisions” refer to legislation that denies relief by reference to the 
amount and terms of the debt. “Tax base erosion” refers to legislation 
that denies relief where it is perceived that the purpose the debt is 
issued is to reduce taxable profits.
 
3.1.1 Thin capitalisation provisions
  Mechanism of the thin capitalisation rules
The key focus of the UK thin capitalisation provisions is the arm’s 
length principle. The main consideration is whether debt financing is 
excessive by reason of the relationship between the borrowing and 
lending companies, in which case interest payments are disallowed to 
16
the extent that they exceed the arm’s length arrangement. That is, it is 
necessary to determine what arrangements would have been extended 
by an unconnected party, including whether the loan would have been 
made at all, what amount would have been lent, and what rate of interest 
and other terms would have applied to the loan.
There is no statutory definition of the methodology to be used for 
determining the arm’s length nature of borrowing. In practice, HMRC 
accepts a range of different measures, including consideration of the 
nature of the underlying industry, business and asset base of the UK 
company, the underlying risk of the UK company, and the cash-flows 
of the UK company. Often the UK company will agree debt covenants 
with HMRC – that is, financial ratios that must be met each year in 
order for all interest expense on related party debt to be deductible. 
HMRC has provided guidance in Tax Bulletin 17 that it would not 
normally consider a UK grouping with a debt:equity ratio of 1:1 or 
less, and an income cover ratio of at least 3:1, to be thinly capitalised, 
although this is not a statutory safe harbour.
Thin capitalisation rules in other tax jurisdictions are generally more 
prescriptive than in UK, and tend to follow explicit safe harbour/
financial ratio tests. For example, in France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Spain, the USA and Japan a fixed measure of debt:equity is currently 
used to determine thin capitalisation, with the methodology to be used 
also prescribed. 
Spain and France also have provisions which determine the maximum 
rate of interest for which a tax deduction is available. The USA’s 
earnings stripping rules apply to limit the deductibility of interest with 
respect to related party debt where the interest income is not subject to 
US taxation. Any interest that is deductible in the USA after meeting 
the debt:equity test is further limited by reference to a percentage of 
current year taxable profits. The USA also allows carry forward of relief 
for any interest not deductible in the current year. The Netherlands 
allows interest to be deductible as long as a Dutch company’s debt:
17
equity position does not exceed that of the consolidated group to which 
it belongs. New French rules which will take effect from 2007 also 
include these last three provisions.7
The forthcoming German 2008 tax reform is of some interest here. 
These proposals repeal existing thin capitalisation rules and introduce 
interest stripping rules, which appear similar in function to US earnings 
stripping rules. Current details of the proposals suggest that interest 
payments exceeding €1m per annum will only be deductible to the 
extent that they do not exceed 30% of Earnings Before Interest and 
Tax (“EBIT”). It will be possible to carry forward any excess interest 
expenses for offset against profits in future periods, subject again to the 
30% EBIT test. The interest stripping rules will not apply where the 
German company can demonstrate that it its debt:equity position does 
not exceed that of the group to which it belongs.
 Response to Lankhorst
In December 2002, the European Court of Justice gave its judgement 
in the Lankhorst case, finding that the then German thin capitalisation 
rules were in breach of the freedom of establishment provisions of the 
EC Treaty. The UK thin capitalisation rules were similar to the German 
provisions, in that neither applied to loans between domestic entities. 
In response to this judgement, Finance Act 2004 repealed the main 
existing UK thin capitalisation legislation. With effect from 1 April 
2004, thin capitalisation provisions apply to all related party financing 
transactions, including those between related UK companies. 
This response to the Lankhorst decision can be compared with that of 
other member states. Germany and the Netherlands also extended their 
thin capitalisation rules to domestic related party financing transactions. 
Spain chose to revise domestic thin capitalisation rules such that they 
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7   In Japan, the thin capitalisation rules apply to borrowings from foreign related parties, although in  
 addition tax relief is denied for interest expense in a period when a dividend is received from   
 a Japanese subsidiary which is acquired using debt finance; this is on the basis that the dividend is  
 exempt from tax.
do not apply to borrowings from related parties that are resident in 
the EU. France’s current thin capitalisation rules only apply where the 
lender is non-EU resident and their application is not prevented under 
the terms of a double tax agreement. Ireland has not introduced thin 
capitalisation rules, although in principle any interest paid by an Irish 
company to an overseas affiliate is treated as a distribution and hence 
is not deductible.8 
3.2  Tax base erosion provisions
There are two key provisions in the UK that aim to prevent interest 
relief where the aim or purpose of issuing debt is to gain a UK tax 
advantage through interest relief. 
3.2.1 Loan relationships for unallowable purposes
Finance Act 1996 introduced detailed legislation governing the taxation 
of “loan relationships”, and includes a provision to deny relief for 
interest expense where the UK company’s purposes for entering into 
the debt (or for entering into a transaction which is related to the debt) 
include an “unallowable purpose”. In turn, “unallowable purpose” 
is defined as a purpose which is not amongst the business or other 
commercial purposes of the company, including a main purpose that 
constitutes a “tax avoidance purpose”  -aiming to secure a UK tax 
advantage. 
Where an unallowable purpose is identified, the company must 
allocate the interest expense, on a just and reasonable apportionment, 
to that unallowable purpose, and no relief is available for that part. 
The legislation does not define the methodology either for determining 
whether a transaction is for an unallowable purpose, or for allocating 
the interest expense.
8  The Irish company can elect to claim an Irish tax deduction where the interest is paid in the ordinary  
 course of its trade and the interest is paid either to a company resident in an EU country or to a   
 company resident in a non-EU country that has concluded a double tax agreement with Ireland.
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3.2.2    Avoidance involving Tax Arbitrage
Finance (No.2) Act 2005 introduced “Avoidance involving Tax 
Arbitrage” provisions. Broadly, these aim to deny UK tax relief for 
expenses, including interest, associated with transactions which have 
a main purpose of eroding the UK tax base through the use of hybrid 
entities or arrangements, which may either generate a double deduction 
for tax purposes for the same expense, or the receipt corresponding 
with the expense giving the UK tax deduction is not taxable. 
This only applies upon issuance of a notice by HMRC, and this can 
be done when they consider that four conditions are met. Condition A 
requires the UK company to be party to a transaction that is part of a 
scheme involving a hybrid entity or a hybrid effect. The term “scheme” 
generally refers to transactions that would not occur in the same form 
independently. Hybrid entities are defined as entities which are opaque 
for the purpose of one tax jurisdiction, but whose profits are treated 
as those of another person for the purpose of another tax jurisdiction. 
Hybrid effect includes convertible instruments, instruments of alterable 
character, or instruments issued as debt but treated as equity for 
accounting and tax purposes. Condition B requires the UK company, 
as a result of the transaction, to claim a UK tax deduction. Condition C 
requires one of the main purposes of the scheme to be the avoidance of 
UK tax. Condition D is that the UK tax advantage is more than minimal.
These provisions have affected US multinationals in particular. US tax 
law allows non-US companies to elect to be disregarded as separate 
entities, which implies that for US tax purposes the income of the non-
US company will be consolidated with the US parent. Interest paid by 
a UK company to a US parent would therefore not be taxed in the US. 
A UK company which has elected this meets the test of being a hybrid 
entity; hence in principle interest paid by the UK company to its US 
parent may no be longer deductible if it results from a scheme where 
one of the main purposes is the avoidance of UK tax. 
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HMRC have issued guidance on their interpretation of the four 
conditions, particularly focussing on their approach to the application 
of Condition C. In general, the guidance suggests that it is important 
to consider what the comparative transaction would have been had 
no hybrid been used. Where the transaction giving rise to the UK tax 
deduction would not have happened in the absence of the hybrid, then 
this is a likely indicator of a UK tax advantage main purpose. 
 Provisions in other territories
As with thin capitalisation rules, tax base erosion provisions in France, 
Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA are 
generally more explicit than the UK provisions. Germany,9 France,10 
the Netherlands and Ireland all have rules that prevent relief for related 
party interest expense where the loan is incurred by a resident company 
to acquire shares in an affiliate. Ireland has certain commercial 
exemptions from these provisions. For example, interest expense 
accruing with respect to a related party borrowing made to finance 
a share subscription by an Irish company remains deductible if the 
purpose of transaction is to increase the capital of a trade or business, 
and the purpose of the transaction does not include the provision of 
funds to the lending party. The Netherlands has similar provisions.
Spain and France similarly have “abuse of law” provisions which 
allow transactions to be challenged and reclassified where they are 
performed for domestic tax avoidance rather than genuine business 
purposes; these can be used to prevent relief for the associated interest 
expense.
The Netherlands and Ireland also have specific provisions with respect 
to the deductibility of interest expense associated with third party 
acquisitions. For Dutch tax purposes, relief for related party interest 
9   These rules will be repealed by the German 2008 tax reform.
10  For French purposes this is limited to where a French company enters into a related party borrowing  
 to acquire shares in a French affiliate which then joins the French consolidated tax group.
21
expense may be deferred for a number of years where no or little third 
party finance is obtained to finance the acquisition. Irish legislation 
sets out specific conditions that must be met to ensure the deductibility 
of any interest associated with the financing of acquisitions. 
In the US, whilst interest relief is denied in specific circumstances, it is 
the earnings stripping rules that are the key provision for determining 
the deductibility of interest expense. The German 2008 tax reform also 
leaves the key provision determining the deductibility of interest being 
interest stripping rules. In Japan the key provisions with respect to 
interest deductibility are the thin capitalisation rules; there are no other 
specific tax base erosion provisions in the Japanese tax code.
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4	 Interest	flows	in	Europe:	an	analysis	of	aggregate		 	
	 data	and	financial	accounts
We now examine empirical evidence on the effects of the differential 
tax treatment of debt and equity on the financial structure of companies 
in Europe. In particular, we aim to compare the average leverage ratio 
of companies resident in each country to the tax rate in that country. 
Other things being equal, we would expect companies resident in high 
tax rate countries to use more debt than companies resident in low tax 
rate countries. 
Beyond that, we would also like to analyse whether the financial 
structure of a subsidiary of a multinational company is more sensitive 
to differences in tax rates than a stand-alone company (which we 
define as a company not owned by a parent company, and which has 
no subsidiaries). This is plausible. A stand-alone company must trade-
off the tax benefits of debt finance against other costs, in particular, the 
higher cost of bankruptcy. By contrast, a company which is a subsidiary 
of a multinational company may be able to use intra-company debt 
without encountering the possibility of bankruptcy.
These issues have been investigated to some extent in the recent 
academic literature, although there have not been a large number of 
studies. For example, Mills and Newberry (2004) estimate a model of 
debt financing that tests whether non-US multinationals’ tax incentives 
influence their US debt policy. They find the foreign multinationals with 
relatively low foreign tax rates use more debt in their US subsidiaries 
than those with relatively high foreign tax rates. Desai, Foley and 
Hines (2004) analyse the determinants of the capital structures of 
foreign affiliates of US multinational firms. They find that 10% higher 
local tax rates are associated with 2.8% higher leverage, with internal 
borrowing being particularly sensitive to taxes. Using Amadeus data, 
Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2006), find evidence that the leverage 
of companies owned by multinationals is more sensitive to tax rates 
than stand-alone domestic companies.
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To examine these issues, we make use of two independent data sources. 
First, we use aggregate data on foreign direct investment. The IMF 
Balance of Payments Statistics publication, contains data on flows of 
direct investment between countries. The most recent available data 
is for 2004. Direct investment is investment in which a resident entity 
in one economy acquires a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in 
another economy; it includes the initial transaction and all subsequent 
transactions between the resident entity and affiliated enterprises, both 
incorporated and unincorporated. 
These flows of direct investment are also split between debt and equity 
(new equity flows plus reinvested earnings).11 Using these data, we can 
calculate the percentage of net inflows of investment into each country 
which is financed by debt. Note that these are cross-border flows. 
They therefore include flows of funds used for greenfield investment 
and for acquisitions. However, they do not include investment by the 
subsidiary of a multinational which is financed locally.   
The second source is the Amadeus database compiled by Bureau 
Van Dijk. This database contains accounting data on the largest 
approximately 250,000 companies in Europe, with consolidated and 
unconsolidated data. In particular, it contains summary balance sheet 
and profit and loss statements, including information on the use of debt 
and payments of interest. The most recent year for which we are able to 
construct a sample of significant size is 2003. However, even this year 
contains missing data. Taking only unconsolidated accounts which 
contain enough information to reliably measure a leverage ratio, our 
sample size is just under 70,000 companies spread over 15 countries. 
To make the aggregate IMF data comparable with the accounting data, 
we also analyse the same 15 countries in the aggregate data.
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11 Debt flows are referred to as Other Capital, and cover borrowing and lending of funds, including debt, 
 securities and trade credits between direct investors and direct investment enterprises and between  
 two direct investment enterprises that share the same direct investors. Equity Capital covers equity  
 in branches, all shares in subsidiaries and associates. Reinvested earnings capital is the direct   
 investors’ shares of the undistributed earnings of the direct investment enterprise..
The Amadeus database also contains details of the ownership structure 
of companies: both the parents and subsidiaries of each company are 
recorded. In principle it is therefore possible to identify the structure 
of groups: multinational groups which operate through companies in 
more than one country, and domestic groups which operate only in one 
country. To identify a company which is part of a multinational group, 
we define a parent company to be a company that has a shareholding of 
at least 50%. Following a chain of ownership through the data enables 
us to identify companies which are members of the same multinational 
group.12 Any company that does not have a parent company defined in 
this way is treated as independent. In Table A.1 in the Appendix, we 
break down companies in our sample according to whether they are 
stand-alone, belong to a domestic group, or belong to a multinational 
group. More information on the Amadeus dataset is also included in 
the Appendix.
4.1		 Aggregate	data	on	flows	of	debt	into	countries
We begin by considering the aggregate data on flows of direct 
investment, which we interpret as flows from a parent company which 
are financing an affiliate in a foreign country. Other things being 
equal, it is more likely that such flows would take the form of debt if 
the corporation tax rate in the host country is higher, since the return 
payable is likely to be untaxed at the corporate level.  
Figure 1 shows this relationship for 15 European countries for which 
we also have Amadeus data. It is clear that the data are consistent with 
the hypothesis. There seems to be a clear upward relationship in the 
data: higher tax rates in the host country are associated with a higher 
proportion of inward direct investment taking the form of debt. At one 
extreme, Ireland has a 12.5% tax rate but almost all inward investment 
takes the form of equity. At the other extreme, Germany’s tax rate is 
nearly 40%, and 40% of inward investment takes the form of debt.
12 This process is complicated by the fact that we do not have data on some intermediate    
 companies, even though they are named as a parent. This is usually because the company is not   
 resident  in Europe.
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Of course, the Figure does not make an allowance for a range of other 
factors which may affect the flows of debt. Nevertheless the pattern in 
Figure 1 is striking, and suggestive of a significant impact of taxation 
on the form of the direct flow. 
Figure	1:	Percentage	of	Inward	Direct	Investment	in	form	
of Debt v Corporation Tax Rate 
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4.2		 Data	from	unconsolidated	financial	accounts	
By using disaggregated data we are able to at least partially control 
for other factors. It is clear from the analysis of the Amadeus sample 
of companies shown in the Appendix that they vary considerably both 
by sector and by size. It also seems plausible that leverage could also 
depend on these factors. The relationship between leverage and tax 
rates in a chart such as Figure 1 might therefore be affected by these 
factors. 
To control for these factors, we first estimate a simple regression 
equation in which the leverage of each company in 2003 is regressed 
on four variables: company size, a dummy variable reflecting the 
sector it operates in, a set of dummy variables indicating the country 
of residence of the company, and the same set of country dummy 
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variables multiplied by another dummy variable indicating whether 
the company is part of a multinational group or not.13 We take the 
coefficient on the country dummy variable on its own as a measure 
of the average “adjusted leverage” in that country. That is, it reflects 
the average leverage in each country after controlling for the effects 
of size and sector. The resulting average adjusted leverage is plotted 
against the tax rate in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Average Adjusted Leverage of Unconsolidated Companies 
v Corporation Tax Rate
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As with the aggregate data shown in Figure 1, Figure 2 seems to 
identify a clear positive relationship between adjusted leverage and 
the statutory tax rate. A very rough estimate based on Figure 2 would 
be that a 10 percentage point rise in the tax rate is associated with a 
10 percentage point rise in leverage. By and large, countries with low 
tax rates such as Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czech Republic are 
characterised by low tax rates and low average adjusted leverage.
However, it is necessary to be cautious in claiming causation: it is 
possible that countries with low tax rates are also countries which have 
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13 It turns out that size does have a significant impact on leverage, but the effect is very small.
other characteristics which may explain low leverage. For example, 
the four countries named tend to have less developed banking systems, 
which could limit the amount domestic companies can borrow. 
That suggests that it would be interesting to compare the leverage of 
purely domestic companies and companies that are part of multinational 
groups, who have rather different options for borrowing. That is, 
independent companies may need to rely on local sources of finance. 
They also have to balance the tax benefits of using debt against the 
costs of becoming more highly leveraged, and hence more prone to 
face bankruptcy. By contrast, companies that are part of a multinational 
group can use intra-group debt and avoid the need to borrow locally. 
Indeed, the results of interviews presented below indicates that large 
UK multinationals tend to lend directly to overseas subsidiaries, rather 
than have the subsidiaries borrow on their own account. While the 
overall group may face an overall constraint on its use of debt, this 
need not apply to an individual company within the group. This may 
mean that the company which is part of a multinational group has more 
flexibility in the use of debt; in turn this implies that it may be more 
sensitive to differences in tax rates. 
To explore this, we compare the leverage of companies which are part 
of a multinational group with companies that are not part of such a 
group. Using the same regression as described above, we measure 
the additional effect in each country of the company being part of 
a multinational group by the coefficients on the interacted dummy 
variables. That is, these coefficients indicate the degree to which 
such companies borrow on average more in a particularly country 
than purely domestic companies. We refer to this as the difference in 
adjusted leverage: it reflects the average leverage for companies which 
are part of a multinational group less the average leverage for other 
companies. 
Figure 3 presents the relationship between this difference in adjusted 
leverage and the tax rate. A positive difference indicates that on average 
a company which is part of a multinational group has a higher leverage 
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than other companies in that country. A negative value indicates that it 
has a lower leverage. 
The results of this exercise are rather surprising. If anything the 
relationship between this difference and the tax rate is negative, rather 
than positive. That is, there is no clear indication that companies which 
are part of multinational groups are more sensitive to tax rates than 
other companies: if that were true, then the difference ought to become 
higher as tax rates increase. If anything, with the exception of Ireland, 
the relationship is negative. That is, companies which are part of a 
multinational group respond less to changes in tax rates than domestic 
companies. 
In the absence of a more detailed analysis we can only speculate as 
to why the leverage of companies which are part of a multinational 
is not more sensitive to tax rates.14 There are at least two possible 
explanations.   
First, Figure 3 contains different types of countries. In particular, the 
four countries where multinational companies do have higher leverage 
are Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania: three new 
EU members and one country about to become a member. This may 
indicate that the use of debt by domestic companies in these counties 
may be affected by limited local availability. 
14 And note that, using a more sophisticated approach, Huizinga et al (2006) do find evidence that the  
 leverage of subsidiaries of multinational companies were more sensitive to host country tax rates.
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Figure 3. Difference in Average Adjusted Leverage of 
Unconsolidated `Companies v Corporation Tax Rate 
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Excluding these countries, however, does not provide the expected 
relationship either. In most other countries, the difference in adjusted 
leverage is close to zero or negative, indicating that domestic 
companies have higher leverage, although that may be due to other 
factors. But additionally, there is no clear positive relationship between 
the difference in adjusted leverage and the tax rate, which would be 
observed if the leverage of companies which are part of a multinational 
group were more sensitive to the tax rate.  
A second possibility is that anti-avoidance measures are typically 
successful in not permitting multinational companies to borrow 
excessively in high tax rate countries. A related explanation would be 
that for multinational companies, leverage decisions are determined 
primarily by factors other than the potential saving through a high tax 
rate. To investigate this possibility in more detail, in the next section 
we turn to the results of a set of structured interviews with large 
multinational companies, which is partly aimed at illuminating such 
issues. 
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5 The practice and views of UK large business
The data presented in the previous section give an overall picture of 
the use of the debt in different countries, and the relationship between 
the use of debt and the host country tax rate. But analysis of such data 
can only provide a general description. It is difficult, for example, to 
use the results to identify the likely impact of potential tax reform in 
the UK. 
To complement this analysis, we have therefore also undertaken a set 
of structured interviews with tax directors of 14 large multinational 
groups in the UK. The sample included both UK and US parented 
multinationals and covered a broad range of sectors. The multinationals 
varied from those for whom the UK generated a minimal percentage 
of the group’s profits to those for whom the UK was the main profit 
centre. In order to generate a comprehensive discussion with each 
respondent, we agreed to treat individual responses as confidential. 
Here we summarise the answers we received, without identifying the 
response of any particular company or individual.15
We asked two sets of questions. The first concerned existing use of 
debt, based on the tax systems in the UK and elsewhere. These included 
questions about the location of third party debt and intra-group debt, 
the main vehicles used for intra-group debt, and the factors which 
are important in determining those locations. We also explored the 
use of hybrid entities and other hybrid instruments, and in particular 
asked about the effects of the 2005 “tax arbitrage” provisions. We also 
explored the likely effects of recent judgements of the European Court 
of Justice in determining financial structure.
The second set of questions concerned the possibility of tax reform, 
and explored how financial tax planning would be likely to be affected 
by some specific reforms. These reforms were chosen to illustrate 
15 Some respondents also preferred to remain anonymous. In order to preserve their anonymity in a   
 small sample, we do not provide a list of respondents.
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the likely impact of major potential change. They were not chosen 
as a prediction of likely UK tax reform, nor were any of the reforms 
advocated.
The principle regime changes discussed were as follows:
1. Reduction of the UK corporation tax rate to 15%
2. Reduction of the rate of relief for interest expense to 15%
3. Introduction of an ‘interest box’ regime where interest receipts   
 and expense are both taxed at 15%
4. Reduction of the UK corporation tax rate to 15%, but no relief for  
 interest expense. 
In addition, questions were asked about the possibility of introducing 
some form of interest apportionment, with the objective of restricting 
interest deductibility to costs related to only UK activities. Various 
potential methods of allocation were considered. 
Finally, we also considered the possible impact of developments 
in the law on Controlled Foreign Companies (CFCs) as well as the 
potential for introduction of an exemption from tax for foreign sourced 
dividends. There is no necessary link between interest deductibility 
and CFCs as such, although the overall cost of the UK’s interest regime 
will create an incentive or disincentive for multinationals to engage in 
tax planning of the kind that CFC legislation is intended to prevent. 
There is some argument for a link between interest deductibility and 
a dividend exemption, in that there is an implied tax relief in the UK 
which creates income which in turn may never be subject to UK tax. 
However, a counter-argument would be that the existing regime also 
effectively allows for no tax to be paid on foreign source dividends. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that changes to either of these may elicit 
different responses from multinationals.
We now turn to setting out a summary of the responses.
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5.1		 Organisation	of	financing	activity
Based on the responses from the interviews, it appears that UK 
multinationals typically hold all third party debt in the UK, and most 
commonly in the top company. Third party debt is generally raised 
outside the UK only by exception. This may occur either where 
particular circumstances dictate that a subsidiary has its own, usually 
local, third party debt or where access is needed to particular capital 
markets. In the latter case, groups generally use a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) to issue the debt, and on-lend back to the UK to the 
extent that the funds are not required in the issuing territory. Therefore, 
even where debt is raised outside the UK it is effectively UK debt, and 
it is invariably issued under a top company guarantee.
The key drivers for the location of third party debt are access to capital 
markets, continued satisfaction of commercial banking covenants and 
a desire in a number of groups to keep central treasury functions near 
to the group centre. There is also the practical benefit of only having to 
demonstrate investment grade debt status for one (or at the most a very 
limited number) of legal entities within the group. It is much easier 
for groups to manage third party debt centrally. The typical model is 
therefore one of centralised fund raising with a system below that for 
disseminating funds to other territories. Therefore most third party 
debt is either physically or economically held in the UK. 
Once funds have been received they are disseminated around the group 
as needed. This is done by way of both debt and equity, typically 
according to the tax profile of both the funding and receiving territories. 
Groups aim to manage the gearing of overseas subsidiaries according 
to commercial need, but lean more towards debt in territories with 
higher tax rates and equity in territories with lower tax rates. (The 
data presented in the previous section confirms this for a wider set 
of companies). For treasury management reasons companies tend not 
to inter-lend between overseas territories. ompanies use intermediate 
financing vehicles, either UK or non-UK, to carry out this activity. 
Those with non-UK intermediate financing vehicles can manage 
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circulation of cash around the group outside the UK without passing 
those funds through the UK.
Inbound multinationals have a similar overall group approach, with the 
result that the UK is funded by a combination of debt and equity from 
group sources rather than third party sources. The key tax planning 
parameter, especially for US inbounds, tends to be home country tax 
optimisation rather than UK tax optimisation.
Few companies make any significant use of hybrid entities or hybrid-
based financial products. The 2005 legislation significantly limited 
the scope for this activity, and respondents generally saw this activity 
as peripheral or opportunistic rather than structural. The effect of the 
Tax Avoidance Disclosure rules is that highly structured tax-driven 
financial products tend to have a very short shelf-life, and most 
respondents preferred to use more stable funding methods. This view 
was corroborated by one banking respondent who commented that 
very few such products are now sold to large UK corporate groups. 
5.2		 Factors	in	determining	the	location	of	a	finance	vehicle
In deciding where to locate finance activity, companies typically 
consider a range of factors, of which taxation is only one. In fact, tax 
matters are often not the deciding factor. More important than the 
current tax system is regime stability, both politically and in terms of 
having clarity and certainty on tax outcomes. Other important factors 
are access to good quality professional finance staff and regulatory 
and company law issues. It is typically after considering these issues 
that companies will consider tax issues, including matters such as 
deductibility of interest, quality of the treaty network and withholding 
tax rates as well as the overall CT rate. Generally there would also be a 
preference for locations nearer to head office rather than further away, 
and a preference for EU locations.
A number of companies commented that the UK ranked very highly 
on all of these measures apart from tax. Specific disadvantages cited in 
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the UK tax were withholding tax on long interest, a relatively high CT 
rate and relatively poor certainty of tax treatment. Inbound companies 
commented that the 2005 hybrid and financial avoidance rules had 
damaged the UK’s reputation in this regard and had had a material 
impact in terms of perceived certainty, even apart from the need to 
change existing structures. Comments on the practical outworking of 
the clearance procedures for these rules were generally though not 
wholly favourable. Few UK groups in the sample felt that these rules 
had had a material impact on their financial structuring, though some 
commented that they had suffered ‘collateral damage’ with previously 
safe or even approved structures falling foul of the widely drawn 
rules. 
5.3  Consideration of the impact of regime changes
Beyond describing the impact of taxes, and interest deductibility in 
particular, on existing financial structures, the interviews also gave an 
opportunity to examine the likely effects of conceivable reforms in the UK. 
5.3.1 Reduction of the UK corporation tax rate to 15%
Comments on this scenario were somewhat tainted by respondents’ 
uncertainty about the quid pro quo for such a change; generally a 
move toward a broader corporation tax base, or further extension of 
the indirect tax base would make the proposition unwelcome. One 
respondent mentioned the one-off accounting impact of reduction of 
the carrying value of tax assets.
However, setting aside considerations of wider changes and considering 
the scenario as it stood, most companies agreed that this would be 
highly favourable. The impact of a significant reduction in the CT 
rate was not just seen in terms of a lower tax bill, but in terms of the 
directional changes that would follow. Companies commented that the 
set of competitor countries for new manufacturing investment now 
included locations such as Ireland along with traditional competitors 
such as France, Germany and the US. Companies make investment 
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decisions on a post tax basis, and with a lower UK tax rate, a number 
of companies would expect new manufacturing to be located in the 
UK rather than elsewhere, although other commercial factors would 
provide inertia against moving existing manufacturing activity onshore. 
Activity in research and development and intellectual property activity 
would tend to move towards the UK. Whilst some groups would still 
chase a lower tax rate elsewhere, the majority view was that at 15% any 
remaining economic downside compared to competitor locations was 
overcome by the other non-tax advantages of operating in the UK.
There would also be a significant impact on financial activity. At 15%, 
the UK rate would be at the lower end of tax rates for most groups, and 
such a reform would therefore create a structural incentive to push debt 
down into subsidiaries rather than maintain a UK deduction at only 
15%. Some companies also commented that if this change were allied 
with an exemption for overseas dividends they would remit substantial 
sums to the UK that are currently held overseas. 
5.3.2  Reduction of rate of tax relief on interest to 15%
This is effectively a disallowance of 50% of interest costs, and was 
considered as an alternative to alternative allocation methods. It was, 
unsurprisingly, seen as very negative. The cost would be substantial 
for many companies, with a high impact on reported effective tax rates. 
Companies were concerned about the impact on UK competitiveness. 
The scale of the financial impact would force companies to try to 
restructure to mitigate the cost. Likely responses include significant 
repatriation of overseas earnings or capital (in order to reduce UK 
debt), and other more aggressive debt pushdown structures. A move of 
this scale would make the UK sufficiently unattractive that a number of 
respondents anticipated questions from their boards about how much 
activity could be moved out of the UK or even whether the company 
itself should relocate; this was seen as quite a realistic outcome in a 
case of a major merger or takeover, when residence issues are anyway 
routinely considered.
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Apart from competitiveness issues there was a strong feeling that, 
subject to existing thin capitalisation limits, UK based activity should 
have full interest relief on debt incurred to finance it.
5.3.3  Introduction of a 15% ‘Interest Box’ regime
In this scenario, interest receipts and payments would both be subject 
to a 15% tax rate regime. Clearly there would be complications with 
the banking sector, but it should in principle be possible to define a 
regime that applied to interest income and expense other than that 
arising in the course of a financial trade. 
The overall reaction to this from UK based multinationals was 
favourable. Most respondents would see a UK 15% interest box regime 
as sufficiently competitive to remove the incentive for offshore financial 
planning, although some felt that the rate would need to be lower than 
15% to achieve that. If this change were linked to an exemption from 
tax for overseas dividends, there was also a strong response that there 
would be significant repatriation of overseas earnings. 
Effectively this was seen as representing a policy choice to make a 
competitive response to the European Court of Justice ruling in the 
Cadbury CFC case, rather than further developing the UK’s CFC rules. 
The regime would provide an economic incentive for groups to push 
debt down to subsidiaries, thus reducing overall UK interest expense, 
and would also provide an incentive to maximise remittance to the 
UK, thus increasing UK interest income. The majority view from the 
respondents was that this scenario would probably be favourable from 
the companies’ perspective and positive for the exchequer. 
There would be winners and losers, as with any significant change. 
Whilst the benefits to financing activity are clear, the change would 
be detrimental for companies with large UK operations relative to the 
overall group activity, and domestic manufacturing would suffer a 
competitive disadvantage. There is still a presumption that UK based 
activity should have full interest relief on debt incurred to finance 
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it, although the offsetting effect of lower tax on interest income 
substantially helps. Respondents offered various refinements, including 
some form of order of set-off, so that interest expense is first dealt 
with in the 15% pool, but any excess is relievable against mainstream 
taxable income at 30%. 
Some respondents commented that this scenario would be very good 
for UK based multinationals, but could prove less helpful for inbound 
investors; the similar system currently proposed for the Netherlands is 
optional, and they would see that as more attractive.
5.3.4  Reduction of CT rate to 15% and reduction of rate of   
  relief on interest to 0%
This scenario would equalise the tax treatment of debt and equity, and 
offer a compensating adjustment in the CT rate. 
This was seen as having a significant adverse impact on competitiveness. 
Every other major regime allows tax relief for debt to at least some 
extent. Some regimes have considered bringing the treatment of debt 
and equity into line, but have done so by giving some form of relief 
for equity rather than restricting relief for debt. Whilst respondents 
appreciated the economic logic (set out here in section 2), they saw a 
significant ‘first mover’ disadvantage for the UK in implementing this. 
In practice, companies would restructure around the change, though 
this would take some time. In the meantime, there would be a major 
dislocation of funding. One respondent pointed out that most debt 
instruments allow for a call at face value (rather than par) in the case 
of a major change in the tax regime such as this; there could therefore 
also be a significant impact on the bond markets. There would need 
to be different treatment for banks and the implied difference in 
tax treatment of interest expense and interest income was cited as a 
negative factor.
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However, a number of respondents felt that such a system could be 
workable once they had restructured accordingly. This scenario would 
mean a system where the prize was substantially removed from 
financial tax planning in the UK and there would be more certainty 
of outcome than at present. Likely responses included aggressive debt 
pushdowns to overseas subsidiaries in order to retain some measure of 
debt tax relief within the group. 
5.3.5 Introduction of interest apportionment
The final set of interview questions considered a possibly less radical 
reform of the corporation tax system, but one which nevertheless could 
be very important: the introduction of a form of interest apportionment, 
where relief is restricted for interest paid on borrowing which is 
undertaken to finance overseas activity.  
The logic for an apportionment of interest expense is that it is 
inappropriate for the UK to grant a general tax relief for debt funding 
where there is no prospect of the business in which that funding is 
invested ever generating taxable income in the UK. Arguably, this 
would especially be the case if an exemption for overseas dividends 
received in the UK were introduced. Such an exemption would result 
in lower tax receipts, and arguably an interest apportionment rule might 
then become necessary. 
However, not surprisingly, respondents made several counter 
arguments to these propositions. In fact very little UK tax is presently 
collected on the receipt of overseas dividends. Companies put varying, 
but sometimes substantial, resource into ensuring that their underlying 
foreign tax credits are sufficient to cover any UK liability on such 
dividends. Other overseas earnings are simply not remitted. There are 
numerous techniques to allow repatriation of cash without payment 
of dividends, should the parent company need it, and companies are 
anyway able to create reserves to support shareholder dividends or 
share buybacks. To that extent, the existing system looks complicated 
for little gain in tax revenue, and most respondents saw the introduction 
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of an exemption system as a welcome simplification measure. Some 
would actively seek to remit more foreign earnings under an exemption 
system. An exemption system was also seen as favourable for inbounds 
because the removal of the complexity of the current system would be 
perceived as a positive, investment friendly move. 
There is an argument that interest apportionment of some sort is needed 
if there is a dividend exemption system to prevent abuse by companies 
who bring back substantial tax free dividends and reinvest in equity 
funded finance vehicles situated in lower tax territories overseas. 
However, several respondents made the point that they are free to 
organise in this way now if they wish; a dividend exemption system is 
not a requirement for this sort of tax planning. Respondents generally 
argued that the right tool to tackle this concern is CFC legislation, 
rather than an interest apportionment system which would impact all 
multinationals regardless of the nature of their tax planning.
However, if interest apportionment were introduced, it could be in 
principle done in a number of different ways, and a range of possibilities 
was considered in the interviews. Respondents identified significant 
practical difficulties in all the cases considered. 
Suppose interest were apportioned on the basis of foreign versus 
domestic income, for example. An important disadvantage of this 
approach is that the degree to which interest is deductible would 
become uncertain. Moreover, the calculation itself would be highly 
complex for any group that had a significant number of legal entities. 
The consensus of respondents was that this could only be workable if 
the UK also introduced consolidated tax filing for UK groups; without 
this an income based approach would give wildly varying results for 
different companies within the UK groups and would need another 
system of group relief to ensure the outcome is equitable. It would 
therefore introduce even more uncertainty into tax forecasting. Apart 
from the resource implications for companies, the view was also 
expressed that HMRC would need to gear up significantly to be able 
to audit the volume of data that this process would produce. Finally, 
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whilst an income based approach provides a reasonable proxy for 
value of investments, it is difficult to apply in industries with a long 
investment lead times.
An alternative is apportionment on the basis of capital employed. This 
was seen by many as being too easily manipulated, although others 
saw it as a reasonable measure with some degree of external rigour. 
Use of an equity-based allocation key was also considered. However, 
historic equity invested overseas is not workable as it produces very 
diverse results dependent solely on how long the company has held 
its overseas investment. By contrast, a market value approach brings 
with it significant compliance effort and a high degree of uncertainty 
of outcome, since it would necessitate annual revaluations of all the 
companies in a group. Groups that currently do this for US purposes 
report it as being complex and capable of giving bizarre results.
One respondent reflected that the US allocation system is very difficult 
to operate and should not be seen as a model for the UK to emulate. 
Apportionment in any form would raise the issue of the competitiveness 
of the UK, since it would emphasise complexity and uncertainty. 
A number of respondents expressed a preference for other, more 
broad-brush measures instead of apportionment. For example, some 
form of arm’s length test for UK debt might be workable, if the UK 
was viewed as a consolidated entity and the debt measure was net debt. 
This effectively views the issue from the other perspective, i.e. from 
the UK domestic business rather than seeking to apportion interest to 
overseas interests. Alternatively, some form of earnings stripping rule 
might be preferable. Use of the parent company or group debt/equity 
ratio as a safe harbour was also supported. 
However, none of these would be generally welcomed or even seen 
as necessary. Rather, they were seen by some as preferable or more 
workable solutions if some restriction on interest relief had to be put 
in place. The balance of opinion was that apportionment in any form 
would be complex to legislate, difficult to administer, uncertain in 
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outcome and damaging to UK competitiveness. Some respondents 
took the view that the implementation issues were so difficult that they 
would prefer to see a partial dividend exemption instead, though this 
view was far from universal and a number of groups were strongly 
against it.16
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16 And, subject to the outcome of the Franked Investment Income Group Litigation Order at the   
 European Court of Justice a partial exemption might itself be susceptible to challenge.
6   Conclusions
This report discusses the treatment of relief for interest payments 
against a UK corporation tax charge. It has four main sections. The 
first outlines conceptual issues and addresses the question: is there a 
good economic justification for treating debt differently from equity. 
The second provides more detail of the existing UK system, including 
various restrictions on interest deductibility that currently exist. The 
next two sections provide new evidence on the impact of existing rules 
on financing patterns, and on the likely impact on financial behaviour 
of various potential reforms. 
Where does this analysis leave us?
On broad conceptual grounds, there is no good economic case for 
treating equity differently from debt. Both are ways of raising funds 
to support investment. The contractual arrangements are different, but 
there is no obvious reason why any particular aspect of the contractual 
arrangements should justify different treatment. These considerations 
have led to proposals to equalise the treatment of debt and equity 
– either by removing the relief for interest payments or by granting 
equivalent relief for equity. 
Of course, the UK is not unique in its differential treatment of debt and 
equity – rather the reverse: it would be virtually unique if it treated them 
equally. Differences between countries lie not in the basic structure of 
the taxation of debt and equity, but in the details, and in particular in 
anti-avoidance legislation. 
The treatment of interest in the UK and elsewhere clearly has an 
impact on the financial structure of companies, and on aggregate flows 
between countries. Section 4 presents evidence of the extent to which 
the form of cross-border flows depend on corporation tax rates. It also 
provides complementary evidence from unconsolidated accounting 
data that the use of debt in both independent companies and subsidiaries 
of multinationals are influenced by corporation tax rates. This is also 
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confirmed by interviews with 14 large multinational companies with 
operations in the UK. 
Given that the UK corporation tax treatment of interest is broadly in 
line with that in other countries, fundamental reform raises some risks. 
On the one hand, companies have arranged their financial structure in 
the light of the existing tax system. At best, many companies would 
find it costly to change that structure. At worst, simply removing 
interest deductibility may leave many companies unable to afford tax 
payments, and hence facing bankruptcy. This may be particularly true 
of smaller companies, although they are not the main focus of this 
report. 
On the other hand, it is possible that bold reform of corporation tax 
could improve the UK’s competitive position in terms of corporation 
tax. For example, a reform which financed a substantial reduction 
in the corporation tax rate by restricting interest deductibility might 
improve the attractiveness of the UK. Of course, this too is uncertain: 
the position of equity financed investment would improve but that of 
debt-financed investment would worsen. 
A fundamental reform might be likely to have other advantages as 
well. For example, a reform which substantially cut the tax rate applied 
to interest receipts and payments met with some approval from the 
large companies interviewed for this report. Most saw a 15% tax rate 
on interest receipts and payment to be sufficiently low to remove the 
incentive for offshore financial planning; debt would be pushed down 
into overseas subsidiaries, reducing the overall UK interest expense. 
Allied to a possible exemption of taxation of foreign source dividends, 
such a reform might significantly increase repatriation of overseas 
earnings. Of course, with such a reform, careful consideration would 
have to be given for the continued taxation of financial companies. 
Apart from considering such fundamental reform, the report also 
considers the case that other factors are driving a need for the UK 
to consider limiting interest relief. These factors are ultimately driven 
44
by judgements from the European Court of Justice. Two issues are 
raised by recent judgements. One concerns the UK Controlled Foreign 
Company regime, under which the HMRC effectively asserts the 
right to tax income accruing overseas on the grounds that the income 
effectively originated in the UK and has been moved abroad for the 
purposes of avoiding UK tax. The second arises from difficulties in 
taxing the foreign source dividends paid to UK companies by foreign 
subsidiaries. 
One response to the latter issue could be to exempt such dividends 
from UK tax. This raises one conceptual issue and one very practical 
issue of tax revenue. The conceptual issue is whether it is right for the 
UK to grant relief for interest on debt raised in the UK, but which is 
funding overseas activities which will not be taxed in the UK. It seems 
reasonable to restrict relief under these circumstances. But note that in 
practice, very little revenue is actually raised from taxing foreign source 
dividends: exempting such dividends is therefore not a substantial 
change from a conceptual viewpoint. Of course, this argument cuts 
both ways: it could be used to justify restricting interest relief even if 
foreign source dividends remained taxable.
The practical issue is whether exempting such dividend payments 
would be likely to lead to an outflow of taxable income from the UK 
(which could be returned, tax free, as a dividend). However, this is most 
obviously an issue for the CF regime. If the CFC is unable to prevent 
a large-scale outflow of taxable income, then the UK corporation tax 
has a serious problem. It is possible that restricting interest relief may 
compensate the foregone revenue to some extent, but it would not be 
targeted towards correcting the problem.
In any case, there is a further practical issue here: is it feasible to 
apportion interest paid in the UK according to whether the underlying 
debt is financing activity in the UK or abroad? In the interviews with 
large companies, respondents pointed to important shortcomings 
for several possible ways of implementing such apportionment. The 
balance of opinion was that apportionment in any form would be 
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complex to legislate, difficult to administer, uncertain in outcome and 
damaging to UK competitiveness.   
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Appendix Amadeus Data
As indicated in the main text, we use unconsolidated financial data on 
just under 70,000 companies in 2003. Table A.1 gives a breakdown of 
this sample by country, and whether the company is stand-alone, part 
of a domestic group or part of a multinational group. 
Table A.1  Sample of companies used
Country Stand-Alone DomesticGroup MultinationalGroup Total
Austria 274 166 170 610
Belgium 2358 1334 1,483 5,175
CzechRep 2237 58 170 2,465
Denmark 679 1253 924 2,618
France 4244 5138 4,963 14,345
Germany 1773 1253 856 3,882
Hungary 1018 55 145 1,218
Ireland 366 47 55 468
Italy 8395 396 845 9,636
Netherlands 377 647 352 1,376
Poland 2236 326 455 3,017
Romania 1828 237 167 2,232
Spain 4418 1878 1,148 7,444
Sweden 1189 2167 1,532 4,888
UnitedKingdom 2476 5080 2,849 10,405
Total 33868 19797 16,114 69,779
Note that there are relatively few companies in Germany, given its 
size. It is under-represented because not all companies are obliged 
to publish accounts. Note that the multinational group of which 
a company is part need not be wholly European, and the ultimate 
parent company need not be European. 
In determining the measure of leverage, owing to missing data, we 
were not able to use a measure of long term debt. Instead, we follow the 
approach of Huizinga et al (2006) who also investigate the impact of 
taxes on leverage using Amadeus data. Their measure, which we also 
use is defined as: total liabilities minus cash minus accounts payable 
as a percentage of total assets minus cash minus accounts payable. 
The sample shown in Table A.1 consists of companies for whom we 
are able to construct a reasonable measure of leverage, and where the 
percentage lies between 0 and 100%. 
As explained in the text, we attempt to control for differences across 
companies due to their size and sector. Information on these variables 
is presented in Tables A.2 and A.3. Table A.2 presents a split of the 
sample according to broad sector of activity. 
Table A.2  Split by Sector
Sector Frequency Percent
Agriculture,HuntingandForestry 785 1.1
Construction 4348 6.2
Electricity,GasandWaterSupply 1543 2.2
Fishing 54 0.1
Manufacturing 22617 32.4
RealEstate,RentingandBusinessActivities 15196 21.8
Transport,StorageandCommunication 4149 6.0
Wholesale and Retail Trade,
RepairsofVehiclesPersonalandHouseholdGoods 21087 30.2
Total 69779 100
Table A.3 presents a split by size, and by whether the company is part 
of a multinational group. We follow European Commission’s definition 
of “large”: that is, companies with more than 250 employees. As shown 
in the Table, companies which are part of multinational groups are split 
evenly into large and small. But domestic companies (stand-alone and 
those which are part of domestic groups) are much more likely to be 
small. These differences make it important to control for company size 
before comparing leverage rations. 
Table A.3 Split by size and group
Size Domestic Multinational Total
Small 59.8% 11.9% 71.7%
Large 17.1% 11.2% 28.3%
Total 76.9% 23.1% 100.0%
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